The Internal Factors Behind the Collapse of the Syrian Political System in December 2024: An Explanation Based on the Concept of the Failed State

Alsheikh, Amjad; Nabavi, Seyed Abdolamir

Volume 15, Issue 3 (Quarterly Journal of Political Research in the Islamic World, Fall 2025 2025) پژوهشهاي سياسي جهان اسلام 2025, 15(3): 45-77 | Back to browse issues page

Mendeley

Zotero

RefWorks

Alsheikh A, Nabavi S A. The Internal Factors Behind the Collapse of the Syrian Political System in December 2024: An Explanation Based on the Concept of the Failed State. پژوهشهاي سياسي جهان اسلام 2025; 15 (3) :45-77
URL: http://priw.ir/article-1-2050-en.html

The Internal Factors Behind the Collapse of the Syrian Political System in December 2024: An Explanation Based on the Concept of the Failed State

Amjad Alsheikh¹

, Seyed Abdolamir Nabavi ^*²

1- Ph.D Candidate, Department of Regional Studiesو Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
2- Associate Professor, Department of Regional Studiesو Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. , s.a.nabavi@ut.ac.ir

Abstract: (27 Views)

This article examines the internal factors behind the rapid collapse of the Syrian political system in December 2024. From the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011 until the end of 2024, the Bashar al-Assad regime managed to survive one of the longest and most costly civil wars in the Middle East and prevented collapse through reliance on internal repression, the mobilization of loyalist networks, and the support of regional and international allies. However, the same regime, which had demonstrated resilience for more than fourteen years, collapsed in a very short period—less than two weeks—when confronted with an offensive by opposition forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, losing control over key centers of governance. This contrast between long-term survival and sudden collapse forms the central question of the present study: to what extent was the collapse of the Assad regime rooted in internal factors, and through which mechanisms did this process unfold at the security, institutional, and societal levels? Drawing on the conceptual framework of the “failed state,” the article argues that prior to its collapse, the Syrian state had experienced a substantial degree of failure across the domains of security, governance, and public functions, and had effectively lost its capacity to exercise effective sovereignty. The findings demonstrate that security inefficiency, the erosion of cohesion and loyalty within the military and pro-regime social networks, a profound crisis of legitimacy, structural corruption, and identity cleavages severely undermined the state’s ability to control territory and manage crises. Alongside these factors, the collapse of public services, the entrenchment of a war economy, and critical dependence on external patrons rendered regime resilience increasingly fragile, such that the military pressure exerted by opposition forces functioned as a catalyst in activating the process of collapse. This study employs a qualitative methodology based on the analysis of library and documentary sources.

Keywords: Syria, Failed State, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Regime Collapse, Civil War

Full-Text [PDF 490 kb] (14 Downloads)

Type of Study: Research | Subject: Special
Received: 2025/12/26 | Accepted: 2026/03/31 | Published: 2025/09/23