Volume 16, Issue 2 (Political researches of the Islamic world, summer 2026)
Political Research In Islamic World (Priw) 2026, 16(2): 31-52 |
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khademzadeh J. The Future of Regionalism and the Geopolitical Strategy of Central Asian Countries after the Ukraine War : From Great Power Rivalry to Regional Convergence. Political Research In Islamic World (Priw) 2026; 16 (2) :31-52
URL: http://priw.ir/article-1-2014-en.html
URL: http://priw.ir/article-1-2014-en.html
Ph.D. Department of Political Science, Specializing in Public Policy / Researcher of Central Asian Affairs , javad_khademzadeh@yahoo.com
Abstract: (504 Views)
Introduction
The war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s influence in Central Asia, creating a competitive arena among powers such as China, Turkey, the European Union, India, and Japan. In response, the Central Asian states have adopted a multilateral diplomatic approach aimed at reducing their historical dependence on Moscow while expanding economic and transit cooperation with other global and regional actors. Within this context, initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road and the Middle Corridor have emerged as key instruments in reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape and enhancing Central Asia’s connectivity with Europe. This study, employing an analytical-descriptive approach, demonstrates that Central Asia is transitioning toward a more sustainable model of regional integration, which has the potential to enhance both economic and security stability. Beyond its impact on energy security and global supply chains, this trend offers a model for the geopolitical reconfiguration of other regions in the post-crisis era. Owing to its strategic location and abundant resources, Central Asia can serve as a vital bridge between East and West and play a pivotal role in shaping the future global order.
Research Question(s): How did the 2022 Ukraine war alter the geopolitical balance in Eurasia, and what impact has it had on the evolution of foreign policy, regional integration, and strategic autonomy of Central Asian countries from the past up to the 2050 horizon?"
Hypothesis: "The 2022 Ukraine war redefined the geopolitical balance in Eurasia and compelled the Central Asian countries to pursue greater strategic independence and reduce reliance on external powers through the development of transit projects, the strengthening of energy cooperation, and the institutionalization of regional mechanisms; however, border disputes, weak cooperative structures, and competition among major powers continue to pose significant constraints on regional integration."
Methodology
His study employs a qualitative, descriptive-analytical approach based on library and documentary data. Information was collected from books, academic articles, and official reports and examined through theoretical and comparative content analysis. Using the frameworks of neorealism and new regionalism, the research analyzes power competition and integration trends in Central Asia following the Ukraine war, focusing on the period 2022–2025.
Findings
Geopolitical, Political, and Security Implications of the Ukraine War on Central Asian Countries
The Russian war in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has had profound impacts on the geopolitics, security, and foreign policy of Central Asian countries — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These five states, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan also part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), have not directly participated in the conflict but have been significantly affected by its wider ramifications.
1. Geopolitical and Political Impacts:
Although maintaining close ties with Russia, Central Asian states have neither supported nor explicitly condemned Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, adopting a policy described by analysts as “cautious neutrality.” This approach allows them to preserve traditional relations with Russia while avoiding direct pressure from Western powers. The relative weakening of Russian influence has opened a geopolitical space for China, the European Union, Turkey, and the United States, prompting Central Asian states to pursue multilateral engagement and diversify foreign relations.
2. Security Implications and Russia’s Role:
Since independence, Russia has played a central role in regional security, through military bases, arms supply, training, and leadership within the CSTO. However, the Ukraine war has strained Russia’s military and political capacity to intervene simultaneously in Central Asia. Key developments include:
• Reduction of Russian military presence: Over 2,000 troops stationed in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were redeployed to Ukraine, weakening border security, particularly along Tajikistan’s 1,300 km border with Afghanistan.
• Decline in arms supply and technical support: Russia provided around 60% of regional arms transfers (2015–2021), but aid fell by approximately 40% during 2022–2024.
• Weakening of the CSTO: In the September 2022 Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan border clashes, the CSTO failed to intervene effectively, as Russian resources were concentrated in Ukraine.
Consequently, regional states increasingly seek security cooperation with China and Turkey alongside Russia, while political confidence in Russia’s rapid crisis response has declined.
3. Foreign Policy and Geopolitical Strategy Post-Ukraine War:
The war has propelled Central Asia into a new phase of multifaceted foreign policy, relative autonomy, and regional identity redefinition. Four potential scenarios for regional foreign policy include:
1. Indigenous regionalism (most probable): Strengthening five-country cooperation and reducing dependency on major powers.
2. Chinese hegemony: Turning the region into China’s economic backyard if Russian weakness continues.
3. Western (U.S.-led) influence: Increasing tension with Russia and expanding U.S. engagement.
4. Russian resurgence: Restoring influence through the CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union if Russia achieves success in Ukraine.
4. Interactions with External Powers:
• China: Expands influence through investments, Belt and Road projects, and logistics infrastructure without direct military engagement, creating economic opportunities while posing risks of debt dependence.
• United States: Focuses on counterterrorism and logistical operations linked to Afghanistan; influence is limited by resource constraints and inconsistent policies.
• European Union: Post-Ukraine war, the EU considers Central Asia a key region for security and energy, seeking strategic partnerships, but faces competition from entrenched Russian and Chinese influence.
• Turkey: Leverages Ukraine-related disruptions to enhance its role as a Eurasian actor, strengthening transit routes, economic ties, and defense cooperation, including projects under the “Turkic World” framework.
• Iran: Strengthens its position as a transit, energy, and diplomatic hub via the North–South corridor, energy cooperation, and multilateral diplomacy, though sanctions remain a significant constraint.
5. Challenges and Realities of Regional Integration:
a. Enduring links with Russia: Despite a relative decline in influence, Russia remains central to regional security, economy, and culture. Economic dependence (remittances, energy trade) and security reliance (military presence, Afghan threat) persist.
b. Political will of regional leaders: Regional cooperation often depends on individual leaders’ initiative rather than institutionalized frameworks. Uzbekistan under Shavkat Mirziyoyev (since 2016) exemplifies how political leadership can revive dialogue, resolve border disputes, and promote regional cooperation. Political changes can quickly alter the dynamics of trust and collaboration.
c. Internal disputes: Territorial, water, and border disputes remain unresolved and periodically flare up. The Fergana Valley illustrates the complexity, where Soviet-era administrative borders became international boundaries, creating disputes over land and water resources.
Discussion and Conclusion
The Ukraine war has not only transformed the geopolitical order of Eurasia but also set the stage for redefining Central Asia’s position in international affairs. For decades operating within Russia’s sphere of influence, the region is now transitioning toward a phase of strategic autonomy and indigenous regionalism. The weakening of Russia’s geopolitical capacity, the growing presence of China, Turkey, the European Union, and, to some extent, the United States, alongside the expansion of domestic economic and infrastructural capabilities, has created a multilayered and multipolar environment in Central Asia.
From a neorealist perspective, these changes represent a “relative redistribution of power” at the regional level; Central Asia is no longer solely a domain of Russian hegemony but has become a field for a complex balance among multiple powers. However, beyond a purely competitive logic, emerging regionalism shows that Central Asian states are leveraging this competition to institutionalize cooperation, strengthen transit, energy, and security partnerships, and move toward a form of indigenous integration. This integration is not ideologically driven but founded on shared interests in security, economic development, and infrastructural connectivity.
In the medium-term horizon (2025–2035), Central Asia’s geopolitical trajectory can be summarized in three key trends:
1.Balanced Multilateralism:
Central Asian states will seek to maintain ties with Russia and China while simultaneously expanding cooperation with Turkey, Iran, the EU, and the US. This approach reflects a form of “active neutrality” aimed at avoiding dependency on a single power.
2.Regional Institution-Building:
Drawing on experiences with multilateral organizations like the SCO and EAEU, a more indigenous mechanism—such as a “Central Asia Cooperation Organization”—may emerge, focusing on transit, energy, and water security. This body could form the nucleus of a new regional order.
3.Infrastructure and Geoeconomic Integration:
Initiatives such as the Middle Corridor, the North–South Corridor, and joint energy and digital projects will form the backbone of future integration, transforming Central Asia from a peripheral region into a central hub connecting East and West.
Nevertheless, challenges including border disputes, hidden elite competition, weak legal institutions, and pressures from great powers may slow and complicate the integration process. Overall, the outlook indicates that Central Asia is transitioning from a “sphere of influence” to a “geopolitical actor”—a region that leverages power competition to consolidate its own position in the Eurasian order.
Policy and Strategic Recommendations:
1. Strengthening Indigenous Regional Institutions:
Establishing a sustainable framework such as a “Central Asia Cooperation Organization” could institutionalize security, energy, and infrastructure cooperation beyond ad hoc agreements.
2. Diversifying Transit Routes:
Developing alternatives like the Middle Corridor and connecting to the North–South Corridor would reduce dependence on Russian-dominated routes while enhancing the region’s geoeconomic capacity.
3. Balancing Diplomacy Among Powers:
States should adopt a multidimensional approach toward China, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the EU to leverage great power competition as a tool for development and stability rather than a zone of conflict.
4. Enhancing Energy and Environmental Cooperation:
Regional cooperation should prioritize water management, renewable energy, and food security to reduce border tensions and increase economic resilience.
5. Active Role for Iran:
By strengthening transit routes, linking Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, and participating in energy and technology projects, Iran can consolidate its geopolitical role as a bridge within Eurasia.
The war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s influence in Central Asia, creating a competitive arena among powers such as China, Turkey, the European Union, India, and Japan. In response, the Central Asian states have adopted a multilateral diplomatic approach aimed at reducing their historical dependence on Moscow while expanding economic and transit cooperation with other global and regional actors. Within this context, initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road and the Middle Corridor have emerged as key instruments in reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape and enhancing Central Asia’s connectivity with Europe. This study, employing an analytical-descriptive approach, demonstrates that Central Asia is transitioning toward a more sustainable model of regional integration, which has the potential to enhance both economic and security stability. Beyond its impact on energy security and global supply chains, this trend offers a model for the geopolitical reconfiguration of other regions in the post-crisis era. Owing to its strategic location and abundant resources, Central Asia can serve as a vital bridge between East and West and play a pivotal role in shaping the future global order.
Research Question(s): How did the 2022 Ukraine war alter the geopolitical balance in Eurasia, and what impact has it had on the evolution of foreign policy, regional integration, and strategic autonomy of Central Asian countries from the past up to the 2050 horizon?"
Hypothesis: "The 2022 Ukraine war redefined the geopolitical balance in Eurasia and compelled the Central Asian countries to pursue greater strategic independence and reduce reliance on external powers through the development of transit projects, the strengthening of energy cooperation, and the institutionalization of regional mechanisms; however, border disputes, weak cooperative structures, and competition among major powers continue to pose significant constraints on regional integration."
Methodology
His study employs a qualitative, descriptive-analytical approach based on library and documentary data. Information was collected from books, academic articles, and official reports and examined through theoretical and comparative content analysis. Using the frameworks of neorealism and new regionalism, the research analyzes power competition and integration trends in Central Asia following the Ukraine war, focusing on the period 2022–2025.
Findings
Geopolitical, Political, and Security Implications of the Ukraine War on Central Asian Countries
The Russian war in Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has had profound impacts on the geopolitics, security, and foreign policy of Central Asian countries — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These five states, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union, with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan also part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), have not directly participated in the conflict but have been significantly affected by its wider ramifications.
1. Geopolitical and Political Impacts:
Although maintaining close ties with Russia, Central Asian states have neither supported nor explicitly condemned Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, adopting a policy described by analysts as “cautious neutrality.” This approach allows them to preserve traditional relations with Russia while avoiding direct pressure from Western powers. The relative weakening of Russian influence has opened a geopolitical space for China, the European Union, Turkey, and the United States, prompting Central Asian states to pursue multilateral engagement and diversify foreign relations.
2. Security Implications and Russia’s Role:
Since independence, Russia has played a central role in regional security, through military bases, arms supply, training, and leadership within the CSTO. However, the Ukraine war has strained Russia’s military and political capacity to intervene simultaneously in Central Asia. Key developments include:
• Reduction of Russian military presence: Over 2,000 troops stationed in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were redeployed to Ukraine, weakening border security, particularly along Tajikistan’s 1,300 km border with Afghanistan.
• Decline in arms supply and technical support: Russia provided around 60% of regional arms transfers (2015–2021), but aid fell by approximately 40% during 2022–2024.
• Weakening of the CSTO: In the September 2022 Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan border clashes, the CSTO failed to intervene effectively, as Russian resources were concentrated in Ukraine.
Consequently, regional states increasingly seek security cooperation with China and Turkey alongside Russia, while political confidence in Russia’s rapid crisis response has declined.
3. Foreign Policy and Geopolitical Strategy Post-Ukraine War:
The war has propelled Central Asia into a new phase of multifaceted foreign policy, relative autonomy, and regional identity redefinition. Four potential scenarios for regional foreign policy include:
1. Indigenous regionalism (most probable): Strengthening five-country cooperation and reducing dependency on major powers.
2. Chinese hegemony: Turning the region into China’s economic backyard if Russian weakness continues.
3. Western (U.S.-led) influence: Increasing tension with Russia and expanding U.S. engagement.
4. Russian resurgence: Restoring influence through the CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union if Russia achieves success in Ukraine.
4. Interactions with External Powers:
• China: Expands influence through investments, Belt and Road projects, and logistics infrastructure without direct military engagement, creating economic opportunities while posing risks of debt dependence.
• United States: Focuses on counterterrorism and logistical operations linked to Afghanistan; influence is limited by resource constraints and inconsistent policies.
• European Union: Post-Ukraine war, the EU considers Central Asia a key region for security and energy, seeking strategic partnerships, but faces competition from entrenched Russian and Chinese influence.
• Turkey: Leverages Ukraine-related disruptions to enhance its role as a Eurasian actor, strengthening transit routes, economic ties, and defense cooperation, including projects under the “Turkic World” framework.
• Iran: Strengthens its position as a transit, energy, and diplomatic hub via the North–South corridor, energy cooperation, and multilateral diplomacy, though sanctions remain a significant constraint.
5. Challenges and Realities of Regional Integration:
a. Enduring links with Russia: Despite a relative decline in influence, Russia remains central to regional security, economy, and culture. Economic dependence (remittances, energy trade) and security reliance (military presence, Afghan threat) persist.
b. Political will of regional leaders: Regional cooperation often depends on individual leaders’ initiative rather than institutionalized frameworks. Uzbekistan under Shavkat Mirziyoyev (since 2016) exemplifies how political leadership can revive dialogue, resolve border disputes, and promote regional cooperation. Political changes can quickly alter the dynamics of trust and collaboration.
c. Internal disputes: Territorial, water, and border disputes remain unresolved and periodically flare up. The Fergana Valley illustrates the complexity, where Soviet-era administrative borders became international boundaries, creating disputes over land and water resources.
Discussion and Conclusion
The Ukraine war has not only transformed the geopolitical order of Eurasia but also set the stage for redefining Central Asia’s position in international affairs. For decades operating within Russia’s sphere of influence, the region is now transitioning toward a phase of strategic autonomy and indigenous regionalism. The weakening of Russia’s geopolitical capacity, the growing presence of China, Turkey, the European Union, and, to some extent, the United States, alongside the expansion of domestic economic and infrastructural capabilities, has created a multilayered and multipolar environment in Central Asia.
From a neorealist perspective, these changes represent a “relative redistribution of power” at the regional level; Central Asia is no longer solely a domain of Russian hegemony but has become a field for a complex balance among multiple powers. However, beyond a purely competitive logic, emerging regionalism shows that Central Asian states are leveraging this competition to institutionalize cooperation, strengthen transit, energy, and security partnerships, and move toward a form of indigenous integration. This integration is not ideologically driven but founded on shared interests in security, economic development, and infrastructural connectivity.
In the medium-term horizon (2025–2035), Central Asia’s geopolitical trajectory can be summarized in three key trends:
1.Balanced Multilateralism:
Central Asian states will seek to maintain ties with Russia and China while simultaneously expanding cooperation with Turkey, Iran, the EU, and the US. This approach reflects a form of “active neutrality” aimed at avoiding dependency on a single power.
2.Regional Institution-Building:
Drawing on experiences with multilateral organizations like the SCO and EAEU, a more indigenous mechanism—such as a “Central Asia Cooperation Organization”—may emerge, focusing on transit, energy, and water security. This body could form the nucleus of a new regional order.
3.Infrastructure and Geoeconomic Integration:
Initiatives such as the Middle Corridor, the North–South Corridor, and joint energy and digital projects will form the backbone of future integration, transforming Central Asia from a peripheral region into a central hub connecting East and West.
Nevertheless, challenges including border disputes, hidden elite competition, weak legal institutions, and pressures from great powers may slow and complicate the integration process. Overall, the outlook indicates that Central Asia is transitioning from a “sphere of influence” to a “geopolitical actor”—a region that leverages power competition to consolidate its own position in the Eurasian order.
Policy and Strategic Recommendations:
1. Strengthening Indigenous Regional Institutions:
Establishing a sustainable framework such as a “Central Asia Cooperation Organization” could institutionalize security, energy, and infrastructure cooperation beyond ad hoc agreements.
2. Diversifying Transit Routes:
Developing alternatives like the Middle Corridor and connecting to the North–South Corridor would reduce dependence on Russian-dominated routes while enhancing the region’s geoeconomic capacity.
3. Balancing Diplomacy Among Powers:
States should adopt a multidimensional approach toward China, Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the EU to leverage great power competition as a tool for development and stability rather than a zone of conflict.
4. Enhancing Energy and Environmental Cooperation:
Regional cooperation should prioritize water management, renewable energy, and food security to reduce border tensions and increase economic resilience.
5. Active Role for Iran:
By strengthening transit routes, linking Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, and participating in energy and technology projects, Iran can consolidate its geopolitical role as a bridge within Eurasia.
| In summary, Central Asia’s future will combine great power competition with smart regional integration—a model in which states balance external actors while moving toward relative autonomy, indigenous cooperation, and self-sustaining order-building. If sustained, this trend could transform Central Asia from “Russia’s backyard” into one of the emerging poles of Eurasian geopolitical architecture. |
Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
Special
Received: 2025/04/30 | Accepted: 2025/09/18 | Published: 2026/09/23
Received: 2025/04/30 | Accepted: 2025/09/18 | Published: 2026/09/23
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