Volume 16, Issue 2 (Political researches of the Islamic world, summer 2026)                   Political Research In Islamic World (Priw) 2026, 16(2): 103-124 | Back to browse issues page


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Ganjian Moghadam A, Rafie H. Mohammed bin Salman and the Personalization of Power: Deviating from Political Norms and Its Regional Implications for Iran (2017–2022). Political Research In Islamic World (Priw) 2026; 16 (2) :103-124
URL: http://priw.ir/article-1-1993-en.html
1- Ph.D Student, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran.
2- Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran. , h.rafie@umz.ac.ir
Abstract:   (531 Views)

Introduction
The political structure of Saudi Arabia has historically been characterized by a hereditary monarchy in which the distribution and transfer of political authority were strongly influenced by intra-family consensus, traditional norms, religious institutions, tribal relations, and the balance among different branches of the Al Saud family. Since the establishment of the Kingdom in 1932, succession largely followed a horizontal pattern in which political authority was transferred among the sons of King Abdulaziz rather than directly from father to son. This arrangement constituted an important mechanism for maintaining intra-dynastic balance and preventing the concentration of power in the hands of a single individual (Al-Rasheed, 2022; Bleigh, 1985: 557; Gharib et al., 2020: 187). The accession of King Salman in 2015 and, subsequently, the appointment of his son Mohammed bin Salman as Crown Prince in June 2017 represented a significant departure from this established pattern. The transition from brother-to-brother succession toward a father-to-son model was accompanied by the progressive marginalization of competing princes, the weakening of traditional sources of authority, and the concentration of political, security, and economic power around the Crown Prince. Such developments raise an important analytical question: How did Mohammed bin Salman’s personalization of power and departure from traditional Saudi succession norms affect Saudi Arabia’s regional behavior, particularly its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, between 2017 and 2022? This study argues that the transformation of the succession mechanism cannot be understood merely as a change in the Saudi royal hierarchy. Rather, it constitutes part of a broader process of political personalization that has reshaped the internal distribution of power and influenced Saudi Arabia’s regional and foreign-policy behavior.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The study employs neopatrimonialism, complemented by the concept of clientelism, as its principal theoretical framework. Neopatrimonial systems combine elements of traditional patrimonial authority with modern state institutions and administrative structures. In such systems, formal institutions coexist with personalized political authority, patronage networks, selective distribution of privileges, and dependence on domestic and external supporters. Political authority is therefore concentrated around the ruler, while institutional mechanisms capable of constraining personal decision-making remain weak (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994: 45; Huntington, 2014: 91). The clientelist dimension of this framework is particularly relevant to Saudi Arabia because political survival can involve reciprocal exchanges between rulers and domestic or external actors. Political support, economic privileges, security guarantees, and strategic cooperation may operate as instruments through which the ruling elite consolidates its position. From this perspective, the relationship between domestic power consolidation and foreign-policy behavior should not be treated as two separate processes. Rather, external alliances and regional strategies may also serve the internal requirements of regime survival and political consolidation. The research adopts a qualitative, explanatory-analytical approach. The analysis focuses on the transformation of the Saudi succession mechanism, the concentration of power under Mohammed bin Salman, the weakening of traditional political constraints, and the subsequent manifestations of this transformation in Saudi Arabia’s regional policies toward Iran and the broader regional order.

Findings

The findings demonstrate that Mohammed bin Salman’s rise to power represented a significant transformation in the traditional structure of Saudi political authority. Before this transformation, the Saudi monarchy was characterized by multiple centers of power within the ruling family, with senior princes playing an important role in political decision-making. The traditional system relied considerably on consultation and intra-family consensus, which limited the possibility of rapid and unilateral decision-making. The emergence of Mohammed bin Salman progressively weakened these mechanisms and moved Saudi governance toward a more personalized structure (Kéchichian, 2022: 61; Hertog, 2020: 213). The personalization of power was reflected in the marginalization of rival branches of the royal family, the restructuring of key security institutions, and the expansion of the Crown Prince’s control over important political and economic institutions. The establishment of highly personalized patronage networks and the management of competing members of the ruling family further strengthened this transformation. Existing scholarship similarly identifies the development of personalized patronage networks, the incorporation of technocrats and loyalists, and the coercion or co-optation of rival elites as central mechanisms of Mohammed bin Salman’s consolidation of power (Davidson, 2021).
The implementation of Vision 2030 and associated social and economic reforms also became an important instrument in this process. Although these reforms introduced significant changes to Saudi society, they were accompanied by greater political centralization. Consequently, the study interprets these reforms not simply as a transition toward political liberalization, but as elements of a selective and controlled modernization process that operates alongside intensified political personalization. This interpretation is consistent with research showing that personalization in Saudi Arabia has affected domestic policy outcomes and reduced the influence of traditional veto players within the political system.
The second major finding concerns the connection between personalization of power and Saudi regional behavior. The weakening of intra-family constraints increased the autonomy of the Crown Prince in foreign-policy decision-making. Consequently, Saudi Arabia adopted a more interventionist and risk-tolerant regional posture than that generally associated with the traditional conservative approach of the Saudi monarchy. The war in Yemen constituted one of the clearest manifestations of this transformation. Saudi intervention was closely connected to Riyadh’s perception of the Houthi movement and Iran as interconnected challenges to its regional security and influence (Alvand & Hosseini, 2020: 10; Vakil, 2024: 117).
The transformation also affected Saudi Arabia’s broader competition with Iran. Riyadh increasingly sought to constrain Iranian regional influence through political, security, economic, and strategic instruments. The expansion of Saudi military capabilities, the development of extensive arms agreements with the United States, support for policies aimed at limiting Iran’s economic capacity, and increasing coordination with Washington and Tel Aviv formed interconnected components of this strategy (Holland, 2017: 3; Vakil, 2024: 102).
A further finding concerns the gradual development of Saudi-Israeli relations. Although contacts between Riyadh and Tel Aviv predated Mohammed bin Salman, the changing regional environment and the Crown Prince’s more pragmatic and personalized approach facilitated deeper strategic convergence. The increasing emphasis on countering Iran and the Resistance Axis provided a common strategic framework for Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States. In this context, normalization with Israel and participation in regional arrangements such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) can be interpreted as part of a broader attempt to restructure regional alignments and limit Iran’s geopolitical and geoeconomic position (Wright, 2022: 42; Zimet, 2023: 19).
The study further finds that Saudi Arabia’s participation in regional economic and security arrangements cannot be understood exclusively through economic considerations. These initiatives also have political and strategic dimensions. IMEC, for instance, offers Saudi Arabia an opportunity to strengthen its geopolitical position while simultaneously connecting it more closely to the strategic networks supported by the United States and Israel. From the perspective of the present study, such behavior is consistent with the clientelist dimension of the neopatrimonial framework, in which external partnerships can contribute to regime security while generating reciprocal strategic commitments.
Finally, the personalization of power has influenced the domestic sources of Saudi legitimacy. The weakening of traditional religious institutions and the introduction of selective social liberalization have enabled the ruling leadership to promote a new political and national identity. At the same time, the continuation of competition with Iran and the securitization of Iranian influence have remained important components of Saudi regional discourse. Thus, domestic modernization and external confrontation should be viewed as interconnected dimensions of a broader strategy of regime consolidation.

Conclusion and Policy Implications
The study concludes that Mohammed bin Salman’s personalization of power constituted a departure from the traditional Saudi model of succession and significantly altered the distribution of political authority within the kingdom. The transition from a consensus-oriented dynastic model toward a more personalized structure reduced the influence of traditional intra-family constraints and expanded the Crown Prince’s autonomy in domestic and foreign-policy decision-making. This transformation is best explained through the combined analytical lenses of neopatrimonialism and clientelism. The regional consequences of this transformation have been particularly significant for Iran. The concentration of authority facilitated a more assertive Saudi regional policy, including intervention in Yemen, increased military cooperation with the United States, support for policies of economic pressure against Iran, closer strategic coordination with Israel, and participation in emerging regional economic and geopolitical projects. These developments contributed to greater competition between Tehran and Riyadh and complicated the regional security environment.
Nevertheless, the subsequent restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia demonstrated that Saudi foreign policy should not be interpreted as permanently locked into confrontation. The combination of strategic competition, tactical cooperation, and pragmatic engagement indicates that Riyadh’s behavior can also be influenced by changing regional costs, economic priorities, security considerations, and the requirements of Vision 2030. Therefore, Iranian policy toward Saudi Arabia should avoid relying exclusively on a confrontation-based approach and instead develop a multidimensional strategy based on political dialogue, economic interdependence, academic and cultural exchanges, and security confidence-building. In this regard, the study proposes expanding economic relations, strengthening academic and cultural diplomacy, developing technical and commercial cooperation, and promoting security dialogue as tactical instruments for managing competition. Such measures could contribute to reducing misperceptions, expanding areas of mutual interest, and transforming the post-2022 relationship from a predominantly competitive framework toward a pattern of proximity, competition, and cooperation.
 
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Type of Study: Research | Subject: Special
Received: 2025/08/27 | Accepted: 2026/09/2 | Published: 2026/09/9

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